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Incentives for reporting infectious disease outbreaks
Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminarayan
September 1, 2009
Abstract. This paper examines the incentives for countries to report disease outbreaks such as swine
u, avian u and SARS to the international community. Even cursory analysis suggests countries have
conicting incentives regarding whether to report an outbreak. Reporting an outbreak may bring medical
assistance, but also trigger trade sanctions to contain an outbreak. Modeling the decision as a signaling
game where a country has private but imperfect evidence of an outbreak provides additional insights. First,
not all sanctions discourage reporting. Sanctions based on fears of an undetected outbreak (false negatives)
encourage disclosure by reducing the relative cost of sanctions that follow a reported outbreak. Second,
improving the quality of detection technology may not promote the disclosure of private information about
an outbreak because more informative reports could also trigger harsher sanctions. Third, informal surveil-
lance  an important channel for publicizing outbreaks  functions as an exogenous, public signal that is
less likely to discourage disclosure than better technology. Informal surveillance can counter false positive
and false negative formal disclosures, reducing the relative sanctions for disclosing an outbreak.
1 Introduction
What are the incentives of countries to disclose a domestic outbreak of an infectious disease to the rest
of the world? On the one hand, countries that report an outbreak may obtain medical assistance from
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organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Such medical assistance could prevent a
small outbreak from developing into a full-blown epidemic. On the other hand, reporting may cause trading
partners to impose trade sanctions to limit the spread of disease to their borders (Michaud 2003, Brownstein
et al. 2006). These sanctions impose large economic costs on the reporting country.1
The inuence of these twin incentives on reporting should not be underestimated. Consider, for ex-
ample, the reporting of meningococcal disease during the 1980s. According to Figure 1, the number of
countries reporting epidemic meningitis (Neisseria meningitis) cases fell dramatically after 1988. While
this may have been due to a fortuitous retreat of the disease, a more likely cause is implicit economic sanc-
tions by Saudi Arabia. Every year, millions of Muslims take a pilgrimage, called the Hajj, to Mecca, Saudi
Arabia. In 1987 there was a large outbreak of bacterial meningitis among pilgrims at the Hajj. The next
year Saudi Arabia began to bar pilgrims from countries with meningitis outbreaks (Moore et al. 1988, Khan
2003). This is believed to have led to a decrease in the willingness of countries with large Muslim pop-
ulations from reporting meningitis outbreaks for fear that their citizens would be prevented from visiting
Mecca. Figure 1 supports this belief.
Saudi Arabia also began requiring all pilgrims be vaccinated, which could have lowered the rate of dis-
ease. However, the requirement was not enforced until the early 1990s. Moreover, the vaccine, which costs
$55 per person, was unaffordable for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa  the so-called Meningitis Belt  that
have the highest rate of outbreaks. So the drop in cases is unlikely to be the result of vaccination. This
conclusion is buttressed by the surge in meningitis after 1996. Since 1996-1997, the International Coor-
dinating Group on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic Meningitis Control (ICG)  an organization established
by the WHO  has provided subsidized meningococcal vaccines to countries at risk of epidemic meningitis
(WHO 2009a). This policy did not result in a decrease in reported cases  consistent with prevention  but
rather an increase in reported cases  consistent with reporting intended to obtain medical assistance.
In this paper we formalize the basic model of a country's incentive to report an outbreak by modeling
the decision as a signaling game. We then extend the model by permitting the country's private information
 its domestic surveillance  to be an imperfect indicator for whether there has been a domestic outbreak of
disease. This extension yields two interesting insights about sanctions.
1For example, when Peru reported an outbreak of cholera in 1991, its South American neighbors imposed an immediate ban on
Peruvian food products. The subsequent loss of $790 million in food sales and tourism revenues far exceeded the domestic health
and productivity costs of the epidemic. As the Peruvian Minister of Health noted, "...nothing compares to the loss of markets [other
countries] took away from us in a difcult time" (Panisset 2000, p. 150).
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Figure 1: Epidemic meningitis cases between 1966 and 1999.
First, some trade sanctions encourage truthful disclosure of a country's private information. Trading
partners will certainly sanction a country if it discloses evidence of an outbreak. But trading partners with
also limit trade with a country that has not reported an outbreak if the country's surveillance is known to
produce some false negatives. In that case the sanctions will reect the risk the country has suffered an
undetected outbreak.2 See Table 1 for examples.3 A country's incentive to truthfully disclose positive
evidence of an outbreak depends on the difference between these two sets of sanctions. The larger is the
risk of false negatives, the larger is the sanction imposed on a country that reports no outbreak. This, in
turn, lowers the relative sanction on reporting positive evidence of an outbreak.
Second, improving the quality of a country's domestic surveillance may discourage a country from
disclosing the results of that surveillance. This nding contradicts accepted wisdom at public health orga-
nizations such as the WHO, the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the United
2The baseline level of trade is assumed to be that which prevails when trading partners believe there is no outbreak. A sanction
is the reduction in trade from this level.
3It is difcult to show examples of sanctions following reports of no outbreaks because countries only formally announce
outbreaks. So the table instead reports examples where countries were sanctioned before they formally announced any outbreak.
The sanctions were described in the press as reecting the fear of an as yet undetected or unreported outbreak.
3
Date Disease Location Sanction
Sanctions imposed even before animal outbreaks
2005 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza
Not
specic Vietnam bans imports of poultry from 16 countries
2006 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza France Poultry consumption fell 20% in France
2006 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza Bulgaria Poultry sales fell 60% in Bulgaria
Sanctions imposed before any human outbreak
1997 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza Hong Kong Hong Kong kills 1.5 mil. chickens
2001 Foot and mouthdisease UK UK tourism and beef industries lost £3 billion
2003 Avianinuenza US US poultry exports may have fallen 3%
2003 Mad cowdisease US US beef exports fell 80%
2003-2005 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza S.E. Asia
S.E. Asian economies lose $12 bil. in output
(Thailand alone $1 bil.; Vietnam 1.8% of GDP);
outside S.E. Asia poultry prices up 20%,
volume down 8%
2005 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza
Not
specic
US bans poultry imports from all
countries reporting animal outbreaks
2006 Highly pathogenicavian inuenza Italy Poultry consumption fell 70% in Italy
Sources: Blayney 2005; Wall Street Journal Nov. 21, 2005.
Table 1: Examples of trade sanctions before countries reported evidence of an outbreak.
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States' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).4 Improving the predictive value of diagnostic
testing lowers the likelihood of false positives test results and thereby increases a country's condence that
medical assistance following disclosure will save lives. But improved testing also increases trading part-
ners' condence that a positive test result truly indicates the presence of an outbreak and therefore lowers
trade following disclosure of a positive test result. If the trade response exceeds the expected gain from
medical assistance, there will be less truthful disclosure.
Finally, we extend the model to incorporate informal surveillance, which may be dened as information
from local citizens and doctors at the site of a potential outbreak that ows, through informal networks of
scientists and public health professionals, out to the public domain. This information is different from the
country's own diagnostic testing  or formal surveillance  and is not sanctioned by the government of the
country experiencing a possible outbreak. However, it is carefully followed by the international community
(Samaan et al. 2005) and serves as an exogenous public signal that provides independent information about
whether a country has suffered an outbreak.5
The public health community has criticized informal surveillance  also called rumor surveillance 
for being error-prone (Harris 2006). For the same reason that improvements in diagnostic testing may
discourage a country from disclosing those test results, improvements to informal surveillance may also
discourage a country from disclose its own test results. Nevertheless, improving the predictive value of
informal surveillance is usually less harmful to disclosure than improving the predictive value of formal
surveillance. The main reason is that informal surveillance ameliorates the inferences made by trading
partners after the disclosure of test results. By contradicting false positive diagnostic test results, it increases
trade when those results are reported. So a country need not fear false positives when deciding whether to
truthfully report test results. By contradicting false negative test results, it reduces trade when those results
are reported. This reduces the relative sanction when a country reports any positive test result.
4For example, WHO has stated that one of the central goals of that organization and of the FAO is to "facilitate ... the rapid
development of new methods for detecting the [avian inuenza] virus in environmental samples" (WHO 2005). Similarly, the
U.S. CDC, has called for the transfer of diagnostic technologies as a central goal in promoting surveillance of avian inuenza
(Gerberding 2005).
The emphasis on quality of surveillance technology has been biased in favor of improving its sensitivity. Both the WHO's
Manual on Animal Inuenza Detection and Surveillance (2002) and the United States' National Strategy for a Pandemic Inuenza
(U.S. Homeland Security Council 2005) stress the importance of improving the sensitivity of tests but do not mention the specicity
of tests.
5Communication with Dr. David Nabarro, UN System Senior Coordinator for Avian and Human Inuenza, September 9, 2008.
But for rumor surveillance (i.e information owing through informal networks of scientists and public health professionals), the
international community would not have learnt of the SARS outbreak in China. Rumor surveillance is also used by WHO and the
public health community for more routine tasks such as acquiring information on malaria epidemics.
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This paper addresses the problem of incentives for reporting of disease outbreaks, but the signaling
model it employs ts a host of other problems. It applies to the case of a hospital deciding whether to
report medical errors to public health authorities. Such reports may reduce patient demand or insurance
reimbursements, but they also facilitate efforts by the medical staff to reduce errors. The model applies to
individuals deciding whether to disclose a disability or mental illness. Disclosure may invite discrimination
but it also facilitates accommodations. It applies to a school deciding whether to disclose information on
the performance of its teachers. Poor teaching results may cause parents withdraw their children, but they
also trigger nancial assistance from the state government. It applies to the case of scholars admitting
errors in their own research. Disclosure reduces the scholar's reputation, but invites ideas from colleagues
about how to improve their scholarship. In each case, we may be interested in improving the quality of
the sender's private information or in having an independent public signal about the sender's type. But this
paper cautions that improving the technically quality of information may reduce the disclosure of private
information.
Within the large literature on signaling, this paper relates most closely  though mainly by departure
 to papers that try to encourage disclosure of private information by punishing non-disclosure of negative
information more harshly than disclosure of negative information (see, e.g., Arlen 1994, Kaplow and Shavell
1994, Arlen and Kraakman 1994, Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000.) This paper rules out such an incentive
scheme because it is not subgame perfect in a one-shot game. Ex post, a trading partner does not want to
insufciently punish honest reporting of an outbreak or excessively punish failure to report an outbreak that
happens to become an observable epidemic. Even if an individual trading partner might want to employ
such an incentive in a repeated game, it is hard to coordinate such a strategy with multiple trading partners.
In Section 2 we present a signaling model with imperfect private information to capture both the basic
incentives to report an outbreak and the role quality of testing plays in incentives to disclose test results. In
Section 3, we introduce informal surveillance  in the form of an imperfect public signal  to the model.
In order to highlight the effect of the public signal, we assume it is received before the country sends a
signal to its trading partner. The public signal is correlated with whether there is an outbreak, but otherwise
uncorrelated with the country's diagnostic testing.
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2 Signaling game with only formal surveillance
This section presents a signaling game in which a country that privately observes a positive result from a
diagnostic test for an outbreak decides whether to truthfully disclose that result to its trading partner. There
are two key assumptions that generate interesting results from the model. First, that the trading partner
cannot commit to a sanction policy that, e.g., punishes the country more if it the country reports a negative
test result but there an epidemic than if the country reports a positive test result. The reason is that it is not
credible to sanction a country less after a positive report to encourage reporting because it requires a country
to take on greater epidemic risk than is ex post rational (and thus subgame perfect). Second, the diagnostic
test is an imperfect indicator of whether the country has suffered an outbreak. We believe this is a realistic
assessment of the value of modern surveillance.
2.1 Before the game: outbreak
The country suffers a disease outbreak with probability p. Neither the country nor the trading partner observe
the outbreak. However, the country performs and privately observes the results of a diagnostic test. The test
imperfectly identies whether there is an outbreak. If there is an outbreak, the test gives a positive result with
probability q. If there is no outbreak, it gives a negative result with probability r. In the medical literature,
the probabilities q and r are known as the sensitivity and the specicity, respectively, of the test. We assume
(p; q; r) are known by all players.
The unconditional probability that the country observes a positive test result is f = pq+(1  p) (1  r).
Since payoffs ultimately depend on whether there is an outbreak, it is helpful to dene the following proba-
bilities:
P = Pr (outbreakjpositive test) = pq
f
N = Pr (outbreakjnegative test) = p (1  q)
1  f
The predictive value of a positive test is P ; the predictive value of a negative test is 1   N . If the test is
informative, then P > p > N . If the test is uninformative, then P = N = p and f = 1=2. Finally,
observe that players' priors on the probability of an outbreak after observing the results of a diagnostic test
are the same as their priors about the probability of an epidemic, i.e., fP + (1  f)N = p.
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2.2 Timing of the game
After the country privately observes the results of the diagnostic test, it learns that it is of either type positive
(t = P ) or type negative (t = N ). Following this realization, it plays the following signaling game with the
trading partner.
1. Signal. The positive type country can send two possible signals. The positive type can report that it
observed a positive test result (s = P ) or report that it observed a negative test result (s = N ). We are
concerned with countries concealing information about positive results, not with countries fabricated
positive results. Therefore, we restrict the negative type to only reporting a negative result (s = N ).
2. Action. Depending on the signal received, the trading country selects an observable trade amount
T  0.
2.3 After the game: medical assistance and epidemic
There are two dangers from an outbreak. The rst is that it may become an epidemic and kill y people in
the country. If the positive-type country does not report a positive result, an outbreak becomes an epidemic
with probability one. If the positive type reports a positive result, however, it receives humanitarian medical
assistance. The medical assistance typically helps contain a disease and, as a result, reduce the probability
that an outbreak becomes an epidemic. To reect this feature, let medical assistance reduce that probability
to (1 w) < 1. We assume an organization, like the World Health Organization, exogenously provides the
medical assistance upon the report of a positive test result. The trading partner observes the provision of the
medical assistance.
The second danger from an outbreak is that, if it becomes an epidemic, that epidemic may spread to its
trading partner  becoming a pandemic  and kill z people there. Whether the epidemic spreads depends on
trade ows T between the host country and the trading partner. To capture this in a simple way, we assume
that the probability of spread is T=T0 where T0 is the level of trade if all players knew for sure that there
was no outbreak.
2.4 Payoffs
Each player's payoff depends on the expected loss of life within its borders and the gains from trade. Let
B (T ) denote the economic benet from trade. We assumeB (T ) is monotonically increasing over the range
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[0; T0) and concave (B00 (T ) < 0).
The positive-type country's payoff depends on the signal it sends. If it sends a positive signal, it receives
medical assistance, reducing the chance any outbreak becomes an epidemic. But the positive signal comes at
the cost of a possible trade sanction as the trading partner reacts by shutting down its borders. If the positive
type sends a negative signal, it forfeits medical assistance, but avoids a trade sanction. More formally, the
positive type's expected payoff is
E [u (P; s = P )] =  P (1  w) y +B (T )
E [u (P; s = N)] =  P y +B (T )
Because the negative type can only send the no outbreak signal, its expected payoff is E [u (N;no)] =
 Ny +B (T ).
Turning to the trading partner, let the function [tjs] represent its belief about whether the country is
type t after it observes signal s. The trading partner's expected payoff is
E [v (T; s = P )] =   [P jP ]P (1  w) +  [P jN ]P
+ [N jN ]N	 T
T0
z +B (T )
The rst term above is the expected loss of life, given the trading partner's beliefs following the signal. The
second term represents the gains from trade.
2.5 Trading partner's strategy
To simplify our characterization of the trading partner's strategy, let T sE indicate a trading partner's choice
of trade in equilibrium E when it observes signal s. In addition, let
T (x) = argmax
T
 x(T=T0)z  B (T ) (1)
9
Figure 2: Relationship between beliefs x about the probability of an epidemic and the economic value B of
trade.
indicate the trading partner's best response level of trade if it believes the probability of an epidemic in the
country is x. Since B (T ) is concave, the optimal value T (x) is a strictly decreasing function of x.6 In
words, the greater the expected probability of an epidemic in the country, the less the trading partner wants
to engage in trade.
We can also simplify our discussion of the country's reporting strategy by dening a function ~B (x) =
B (T (x)) which describes the relationship between (i) a trading partner's beliefs about the probability of
an epidemic in the country and (ii) the economic benet from the level of trade the trading partner chooses.
This function is illustrated in Figure 2. Because B (T ) is monotonically increasing (see panel A), the
best-response curve for trade (panel B) implies that ~B (x) is also strictly decreasing in the trading partner's
beliefs (Panel C). Later, when we examine whether improved technology encourages truthful disclosure,
the answer will depend on the slope of ~B, i.e., the rate at which the economic value of trade contracts as the
trading partner's posterior belief on the probability of an epidemic rises.
2.6 Equilibrium concept
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium E of the signaling game we have described consists of a set of signals and
trade ows {s(P ); s(N); T sE} and a set of beliefs {[P js]} such that the following both hold.
6The rst-order condition for (1) is B0 (T ) = xz=T0. The second-order condition is satised because B00 (T ) < 0 by
assumption.
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1. Each country type and the trading partner maximizes its expected payoff given the beliefs and strategy
choices of the other players.
2. The trading partner's beliefs are as follows: (a) when the information set is on the equilibrium path
the beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategies via Bayes rule and (b) when the information set
is off the equilibrium path the beliefs form a probability distribution over the country types.
2.7 Results
We explore three equilibria of the signaling game between the country and its trading partner: separating,
pooling, and semi-separating. The existence of each equilibria depends on the accuracy of the diagnostic
test and the efcacy of the medical assistance. Before turning to the comparative statics, we describe the
parameter ranges over which the positive type truthfully reveals the outbreak and over which it hides the test
result.
Proposition 1 There are values for lives lost in an epidemic
y =
~B
 
N
  ~B  P (1  w)
Pw
& y =
~B (p)  ~B  P (1  w)
Pw
(2)
such that (i) if y  y, there exists a separating equilibrium (SE) dened as
s(P ) = P s(N) = N
[P jP ] = 1 [P jN ] = 0
TPSE = T (
P (1  w)) TNSE = T (N )
and (ii) if y  y, there exists a pooling equilibrium (PE) dened as
s(P ) = s(N) = N
[P jN ] = f [P jP ] = 1
TNPE = T ((1  f)N + fP ) = T (p) TPPE = T (P (1  w))
Proof. (i) By (1), TPSE and TNSE provide the trading partner its highest payoffs given the beliefs [P jP ] = 1
and [P jN ] = 0, respectively. Since the negative type has no choice, we need only consider deviations
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by the positive type. The positive type cannot protably deviate if  P (1  w) y + ~B  P (1  w)) 
 P y + ~B  N, where, recall, ~B (x) = B (T (x)). Rearranging yields y  y.
(ii) By (1), TPPE and T
N
PE provide the trading partner its highest payoffs given the beliefs [P jP ] = 1
and [P jN ] = f , respectively.7 The off-the-equilibrium-path belief [P jP ] = 1 is consistent with the
strategies since only the positive type can declare an outbreak. The positive type cannot protably deviate if
 P y + ~B (p)   P (1  w) y + ~B  P (1  w). Solving for y yields y  y.
The benet of truthfully disclosing a positive test result is that the country receives medical assistance,
which reduce the probability of an epidemic by w and thus saves Pwy lives. The cost is that the trading
partner may reduce the level  and thus the economic value  of trade with the country. In a separating
equilibrium, if the country reports a positive result, the trading partner expects it actually observed a positive
test and will receive medical assistance. Therefore, the trading partner expects the probability of an epidemic
is P (1  w). If the country reports a negative result, the trading partner believes there was a negative result
so the probability of an epidemic is expected to be N .
Recall that the level of trade falls in the trading partner's expectation of risk from an epidemic. There-
fore, if P (1  w) > N ,8 the economic value of trade sanctions when the country truthfully reports is
~B
 
N
  ~B  P (1  w) > 0. The country will still report a positive test result if the value of lives saved
exceeds the value of trade sanctions: Pwy  ~B  N   ~B  P (1  w). Solving for y reveals that a
separating equilibrium exists when y  y.
A pooling equilibrium requires that the positive type prefers not to report its positive result. The benet
of truthful reporting is, as before, Pwy lives are saved. The cost, however, is different. In a pooling
equilibrium, a negative report is uninformative. Therefore, the trading partner believes the probability of an
epidemic is simply its prior belief about an epidemic, or p.
If the positive type ventures off the equilibrium path and discloses a positive result, the trading partner
expects it is a positive type and, after accounting for medical assistance, believes the risk of an epidemic
is P (1  w). So long as P (1  w) > p, there will be a trade sanction from reporting. The positive
type will pool with the negative type if the cost of the sanction exceeds the benet of medical assistance:
7If ~B (x) is concave, then the trading partner can do strictly better by randomizing between T
 
P

with probability f and
T
 
N

with probability 1   f . By Jensen's inequality, f ~B  P  + (1  f) ~B  N  ~B  fP + (1  f)N = ~B (p). Of
course this will change y to y0 =
h
f ~B
 
P

+ (1  f) ~B  N  ~B  P (1  w)i =Pw.
8If P (1  w) < N , there will be greater trade when the positive type discloses. With no cost at all to disclosing, the country
will always do so.
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~B (p)   ~B  P (1  w)  Pwy. Solving for y reveals a pooling equilibrium is possible only if y < y.
(If P (1  w) < p, there is no sanction to reporting. In that case, y < 0 and no pooling equilibrium exists.)
Since the risk the trading partner assigns to the negative type is lower in a separating equilibrium (N )
than in a pooling equilibrium (p), the level of trade enjoyed by negative types is greater in the separating
equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium and there is actually more to lose by truthful reporting in the
separating equilibrium. Therefore, y > y and there is no overlap between the region permitting a separating
equilibrium and that permitting a pooling equilibrium. In between these regions lies a semi-separating
equilibrium:
Proposition 2 For every value ofm 2 [0; 1], there is a
y(m) =
~B

fmP+(1 f)N
fm+(1 f)

  ~B  P (1  w)
Pw
2 [y; y]
such that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium (SSE) dened as
s (P ) =
8><>: P with probability 1 mN with probabilitym
9>=>; s (N) = N
 [P jP ] = 1  [P jN ] = fmfm+(1 f)
TPSSE = T (
P (1  w)) TNSSE = T

fmP+(1 f)N
fm+(1 f)

Proof. By (1), TPSSE and TNSSE are optimal for the trading partner given the beliefs,  [P jP ] = 1 and
 [P jN ] = fm= [fm+ (1  f)].9 For the positive type to mix, it must be indifferent between signaling
positive and signaling negative. For any given value TNSSE (which depends onm), this occurs when
 P (1  w)y + ~B  P (1  w) =  P y + ~BfmP + (1  f)N
fm+ (1  f)

(3)
9As in the pooling equilibrium, if ~B (x) is concave, then Jensen's inequality suggests the trading partner can do strictly better
by randomizing between T
 
P

with probability  [P jN ] and T  N with probability 1   [P jN ]. Of course this will change
y (m) to
fm
fm+(1 f)
~B
 
P

+ (1 f)
fm+(1 f)
~B
 
N
  ~B  P (1  w)
Pw
2 [y0; y]
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Figure 3: Relationship between y and the equilibrium of the signalling game.
Solving (3) denes the value of y that supports a given mixed strategy (m; 1 m). Finally, observe that
d
dm
fmP + (1  f)N
fm+ (1  f) =
f (1  f)  P   N
[fm+ (1  f)]2 > 0
and limm!0 y (m) = y and limm!1 y (m) = y, so y 2 [y; y].
Consider the trading partner's beliefs when it observes a negative signal. Believing that the positive
type sends a negative signal with probabilitym, the trading partner thinks the country is a positive type with
probability  [P jN ] = fm= [fm+ (1  f)]. Given the risk from a non-disclosing positive type is N , the
trading partner expects the probability of an epidemic be  [P jN ]P + (1   [P jN ])N . Contrast this to
the probabilities N and p it assigns to an epidemic following a negative signal in a separating and pooling
equilibrium, respectively. It is evident that as the country's probability (m) of hiding its positive result goes
to 0 and 1, the trading partner's beliefs about an epidemic converge to those in a separating and pooling
equilibrium, respectively. This implies that y (m) converges to the thresholds for a separating equilibrium
(y) and a pooling equilibrium (y), respectively.
As a result, the equilibrium for the game can be neatly mapped onto three intervals of y as illustrated in
Figure 3.10
It is important to note that this gure does not imply that the central parameter of the model is y. We use y
as the parameter on which to index the ranges for different equilibria only for convenience. Other choices of
index parameters, e.g., w, P , N or z are as important as y for dening the ranges for different equilibria,
but embedded in the function ~B. Dening ranges in terms of any of these parameters would involve the
unintuitive use of implicit functions.
10It is important to note that this gure does not imply that the central parameter of the model is y or simply that countries with
larger populations at risk are more likely to truthfully disclose test results. We use y as the parameter on which to index the ranges
for different equilibria only for convenience. Other choices of index parameters, e.g., w, P , N or z are embeded in the function
~B. Dening ranges in terms of any of these parameters would involve to unintuitive  and challenging  use of implicit functions.
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That said, it is true that, as the domestic mortality (y) from an epidemic rises, the country is more likely
to truthfully disclose because the expected medical benets to disclosure rise. For the same reason, however,
increasing the medical assistance (w) upon disclosure lowers the thresholds y and y and thereby promotes
truthful disclosure. The effect of trading partner mortality (z) is more complicated:
Proposition 3 Increasing z encourages truthful disclosure if ~B is concave and discourages disclosure if ~B
is convex. If ~B is linear, z has no effect on disclosure.
Proof. An increase in z has the following effect on the separating equilibrium threshold:
dy
dz
=
B0
 
T
 
N
 dT(N)
dz  B0
 
T
 
P (1  w) dT(P (1 w))dz
Pw
(4)
From (1), the rst order condition used to derive T (x) is  xz=T0   B0 (T ) = 0: Comparative statics to
derive the effect of x and z on T reveals
dT
dz
=
 x
T0B00 (T )
dT
dx
=
 z
T0B00 (T )
so dT=dz = (dT=dx) (x=z). Plugging this into (4) and using the fact that d ~B=dx = (dB=dT ) (dT=dx)
yields
dy
dz
=
~B0
 
N

N  B0  P (1  w)P (1  w)
zPw
Since ~B is decreasing, the tangent at N intersects the y-axis at a higher (lower) point than the tan-
gent at P (1  w) if ~B is concave (convex). But since ~B0 (x) < 0, this implies that ~B0  NN <
(>)B0
 
P (1  w)P (1  w) if ~B is concave (convex). Since zPw > 0, the result extends to y. The
same analysis applies to the effect of z on the pooling equilibrium threshold y.
An increase in potential mortality z reduces trade because the trading partner has more to fear from an
epidemic that reaches its shore. But an increase in z reduces trade in both the case where the positive type
country sends a negative signal and the case whether it sends a positive signal signal. The net effect of z
on truthful reporting depends on whether trade falls more when the positive type truthfully sends a positive
signal or when it conceals with a negative signal. That in turn depends on whether the economic value of
trade ( ~B) is concave or convex in the trading partner's beliefs about the probability of an epidemic. When
the value of trade is concave, increasing the trading partner's fears has a diminishing effect on the value of
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trade. So increasing has less marginal effect on trade after a positive signal than on trade after a negative
signal. Thus increasing z encourages the sending of a positive signal. The opposite is true when the value
of trade is convex in the trading partner's fears.
A more surprising result concerns the value of better testing technology:
Proposition 4 Improving the predictive value of testing technology may discourage truthful reporting.
Proof. Increasing P has the following effects on y and y:
dy
dP
=   y
P
 
~B0
 
P (1  w) (1  w)
Pw
(5)
dy
dP
=   y
P
 
~B0
 
P (1  w) (1  w)
Pw
(6)
These are positive if
  ~B0  P (1  w)P (1  w) > Pwy (7)
  ~B0  P (1  w)P (1  w) > Pwy (8)
respectively. Increasing the predictive value of a negative result, i.e., 1   N , affects the thresholds as
follows:
  dy
dN
=  
~B0
 
N

Pw
> 0
  dy
dN
= 0
Better testing technology is captured by an increase in the positive predictive value of a positive test
(P ) or the negative predictive value of a negative test (1  N ). From (5) it is apparent that increasing P
has two effects on the threshold for a separating equilibrium (y). According to the rst term, it increases the
expected gain from medical assistance. Since a positive test is now more likely to indicate an outbreak, it
is also true that any given level of assistance is more likely to save lives. However, according to the second
term, a higher P also increases the trading partner's expectation that there is an epidemic. This will cause
it to restrict trade. If the reduction in trade is greater than the additional expected lives saved, the range of
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Figure 4: Better testing technology encourages truthful disclosure only if ~B is sufciently concave.
y over which the country will truthfully report will shrink. A similar analysis explains how P might also
increase the threshold for a pooling equilibrium (y).
Whether tests with greater positive predictive value (P ) encourages or discourages truthful disclosure
depends on the curvature of the benets from trade ( ~B). Mechanically, conditions (5) and (6) imply that
better technology increases sanctions more than medical benets if
  ~B0  P (1  w)P (1  w) > Pwy = ~B  N  ~B  P (1  w)
  ~B0  P (1  w)P (1  w) > Pwy = ~B (p)  ~B  P (1  w)
respectively, where we have used (2) to substitute for y and y. The right-hand side now expresses the
medical benets of truthful disclosure in terms that allow apples-to-apples comparisons of sanctions and
medical benets. Obviously, if ~B were linear or convex, the left-hand side would exceed the right-hand
side. The effect of higher P on sanctions would dominate and truthful reporting would be discouraged.
This is illustrated for the y threshold in Panel A of Figure 4. If, however, ~B were sufciently concave that
additional risk of an epidemic had a smaller effect on the benet of trade than on medical benets, higher
P technology would encourage truthful reporting, as in Panel B.
The intuition is similar to that for the effect of mortality (z) in the trading partner. Greater positive
predictive value of test result increases the trading partner's fears of an epidemic. If the benet from trade
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is convex in those fears, that means that trade falls a lot as fear rises. So a higher positive predictive causes
a big reduction in trade, outweighing the linear benets of positive predictive value on medical benets
(Pwy or Pwy). If the benets from trade are sufciently concave in the fear of an epidemic, then trade
falls much less as fear rises. So a higher positive predictive value may increase linear medical benets more
than it reduces concave concave trade benets.
Unfortunately, there is no chance that improving the negative predictive value of tests (1 N ) promotes
reporting. Since this improvement reduces the number of false positives, it has no effect on the value of
medical assistance. However, increasing the predictive value of a negative result does reduces sanctions
when the country signals a negative test in a separating equilibrium.11 The result is to increase the relative
sanctions against truthful disclosure.12
3 Signaling game with formal and ex ante informal surveillance
In this section we introduce informal surveillance to the model in the previous section. This surveillance
takes the form of an exogenous public signal correlated with whether there was an outbreak in the country,
but independent of the test result privately observed by the country.
3.1 Before the game: public signal
The same public signal is sent to both players just after the country privately observes the result of the
diagnostic test for whether it has experienced an outbreak, but before the country and the trading partner
play the signaling game in subsection 2.2. The public signal, like the country's private diagnostic test is
imperfect. We shall employ the superscript i to indicate variables associated with informal surveillance. Let
qi and ri be the sensitivity and specicity, respectively, of the public signal. We assume
 
qi; ri

are known
to all players. The unconditional probability of a positive public signal is f i = pqi + (1  p)  1  ri.
To indicate cases where informal surveillance produces a positive and negative signal, we shall use the
11Because a negative signal is uninformative in a pooling equilibrium, the improvement has no impact on sanctions in such an
equilibrium.
12If one is interested in more precise changes in technology, such as changes in the sensitivity q and specicity r of a test, the
effects are more convoluted. Improvements in sensitivity and specicity both increase P and lower N , though sensitivity has
greater positive effects on P and specicity has greater negative effects on N .
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superscripts iP and iN , respectively. Let
iP = Pr (outbreakji = P ) = pq
i
f i
iN = Pr (outbreakji = N) = p
 
1  qi
1  f i
be the predictive value of the public signals. We assume the public signal and the country's private test are
independent. So, upon observing both, the country updates its posterior on the probability of an outbreak
as follows:
P;iP = Pr (outbreakjt = P; i = P ) = P 
iP
p
P;iN = Pr (outbreakjP;N) = P 
iN
p
N;iP = Pr (outbreakjN;P ) = N 
iP
p
N;iN = Pr (outbreakjN;N) = N 
iN
p
If the public signal is informative, then P;iP > P > P;iN and N;iP > N > N;iN .
3.2 Signaling game
After both players receive the public signal and the country observes the result of its private diagnostic test,
the players play a signaling game similar to that in subsection 2.2. The main difference is that, although
there are still two types, t = fP;Ng, there are also two information sets at which the country may act,
i = fP;Ng. Therefore, there are actually two signaling games that may be played. One is when the
public signal is positive, and the other is when it is negative. Conditional on the public signal, the signaling
game proceeds as before. Moreover, the nature of medical assistance and the probabilities of an epidemic
following the game are unchanged.
3.3 Payoffs
The players' payoffs again depend on the expected loss of life in an epidemic and the gains from trade.
However, the players' posterior beliefs about the probability of an epidemic and their choice of signal or
trade reect the public signal.
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The positive-type country's payoffs are:
E [u (t = P; i = P; s = P )] =  P;iP (1  w) y +B (T )
E [u (P;N; P )] =  P;iN (1  w) y +B (T )
E [u (P; P;N)] =  P;iP y +B (T )
E [u (P;N;N)] =  P;iNy +B (T )
Because the negative type country's signal set is restricted its payoffs are simplyE [u (t = N; i = P; s = N)] =
 N;iP y +B (T ) and E [u (N;N;N)] =  N;iNy +B (T ).
Turning to the trading partner, let the function [tji; s] represent the trading partner's belief about the
country's type t after it observes the public signal i and the country's signal s. The trading partner's expected
payoff is
E [v (T; i; s = P )] =  f [P ji = P; s = P ]P;iP (1  w)
+ [P jN;P ]P;iN (1  w)
+ [P jP;N ]P;iP +  [P jN;N ]P;iN
+
 
 [N jP;N ]N;iP +  [N jN;N ]N;iNg T
T0
y +B (T )
3.4 Trading partner's strategy and equilibrium concept
The denition of the functions T (x) and ~B (x) are unchanged. The equilibrium concept is also the same,
except that the country's signal and the trading partner's beliefs about type and trade strategy will depend
on the public signal. Specically, let T i;sE indicate a trading partner's choice of trade in equilibrium E when
it observes private signal s and public signal i.
3.5 Results
Although there are different signaling games being played when there are positive and negative public
signals, the equilibria for the games are symmetric in the sense that, other than conditioning on a positive
or negative public signal, all the other characteristics of a type of equilibrium are the same. Therefore, to
economize on space, we shall describe the equilibria for the signaling game after an arbitrary signal i. The
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precise equilibria for the game after a positive (negative) public signal may described by replacing each i
condition with i = P (i = N ) and each i superscript with i = iP (i = iN ).
Proposition 5 There are values for lives lost in an epidemic
yi =
~B
 
N;i
  ~B  P;i (1  w)
P;iw
(9)
yi =
~B
 
i
  ~B  P;i (1  w)
P;iw
(10)
such that (i) if y  yi, there exists a separating equilibrium (SE) dened as
s(t = P; i) = P s(N; i) = N
[P ji; s = P ] = 1 [P ji;N ] = 0
T i;PSE = T (
P;i(1  w)) T i;NSE = T (N;i)
and (ii) if y  yi, there exists a pooling equilibrium (PE) dened as
s(P; i) = s(i;N) = N
[P ji;N ] = f i [P ji; P ] = 1
T i;NPE = T (f
P;i + (1  f)N;i) = T  i T i;PPE = T (i;P (1  w))
Proof. See proof for Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 For every value ofm 2 [0; 1], there is a
y(m; i) =
~B

fmP;i+(1 f)N;i
fm+(1 f)

  ~B  P;i (1  w)
P;iw
2 [yi; yi]
such that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium (SSE) dened as
s (t = P; i) =
8><>: P with probability 1 mN with probabilitym
9>=>; s (N; i) = N
 [P ji; s = P ] = 1  [P ji;N ] = fmfm+(1 f)
T i;PSSE = T (
P;i(1  w)) T i;NSSE = T

fmP;i+(1 f)N;i
fm+(1 f)

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Proof. See proof for Proposition 2.
Given the similarity between equilibria without a public signal and equilibria conditional on a public
signal, the following proposition should come as no surprise:
Proposition 7 Improving the predictive value of testing technology may discourage truthful reporting even
in the presence of informal surveillance.
Proof. See proof for Proposition 4
Indeed, the same point may be made about the presence of informal surveillance itself.
Proposition 8 The presence of informative informal surveillance may discourage truthful reporting.
Proof. See appendix.
Such surveillance may discourage disclosure because it increases trade sanctions along with the expected
medical benets of reporting. Comparing the effects of private testing and informal surveillance, however,
reveals that in most cases improvements to private testing discourage reporting more than improvements to
public surveillance:
Proposition 9 At the positive public signal node: (i) increasing the predictive value of a positive private
test result raises both y and y more than increasing the predictive value of a positive public signal; (ii)
increasing the predictive value of a negative test result raises y more than increasing the predictive value of
a negative public signal; and (iii) there is no difference between the effect of increasing the predictive value
of negative test result and increasing the predictive value of a negative public signal on y.
At the negative public signal node: (i) increasing the predictive value of a positive private test result
raises y and y more than increasing the predictive value of a positive public signal if increasing the predic-
tive value of a positive test result increases y and y, respectively; (ii) increasing the predictive value of a
negative test result raises y more than increasing the predictive value of a negative public signal if increas-
ing the predictive value a positive test result raises y; and (iii) increasing the predictive value of a negative
public signal raises y more than increasing the predictive value of a negative test result if increasing the
predictive value of a negative public signal raises y.
22
Equili-
brium Improvement in predictive value of
Node threshold Positive result Negative result
Positive SE Private test Private test
Positive PE Private test No difference
Negative SE Private test ifit raises SE threshold
Private test if
more predictive
positive private test
raises SE threshold
Negative PE Private test ifit raises PE threshold
Public signal worse if
it raises PE threshold
Table 2: Would improvements to the private test or improvemenst to the public signal do more to discourage
truthful reporting?
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition is summarized in table 2. The main reason that improvements to informal surveillance
may be less harmful is that they moderate inferences based on private testing. In cases where better private
testing discourages truthful reporting, improvements to informal surveillance therefore encourage truthful
reporting. For example, a positive public signal blunts the effect of any negative signal sent by the country.
Since a more predictive negative test result always reduces trade, a more predictive positive public signal
increases trade following a negative signal. This reduces the implicit trade sanction from sending a positive
signal and thus the cost of truthful reporting.13 Likewise, a negative public signal blunts the effect of any
positive signal sent by the country. If a more predictive positive test result reduces trade, a more predictive
negative public signal will encourage trade following a positive signal. This reduces the cost of a public
signal and thus truthful reporting.
Improvements to informal surveillance have no impact in the off-diagonal cases, i.e., increasing the
predictive value of a positive public signal has no impact at the negative public signal node and vice versa. In
these cases, whether improvements to private testing are better than improvements to informal testing hinge
on whether better private testing encourages truthful reporting. For instance, because a more predictive
negative test result always discourages truthful reporting, it is worse than more predictive negative public
signal at the positive public signal node.
13The only case where this does not hold is for the pooling equilibrium threshold at the negative node. Increasing the predictive
value of a negative public signal does not blunt the predictive value of a negative test result because the two types of country pool.
So the negative signal from the country does not reveal a negative test result.
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4 Conclusion
Recent history has witnessed both epidemics that spread quickly and epidemics that are lethal. The 2002-
3003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infected over 8000 people in 27 countries
within just 9 months. The world was spared, however, because it had a low case fatality rate of 9.6% (WHO
2009b). Highly pathogenic avian inuenza (HPAI), in contrast, has a high case fatality rate (~60%), but
fortunately has not been able to achieve human-human transmission.14 Currently, we are in the midst of
a global swine u epidemic. As of August 23, 2009, over 200 thousand individuals have been infected in
60 different countries. Fortunately swine u has had a low case fatality rate (~1%) (WHO 2009d). If our
luck run out and we experience an epidemic that both spreads quickly and has a high case fatality rate, the
consequences would be devastating. By one estimate, a modern epidemic as severe as the 1918 u could
kill 62 million individuals (Murray et al 2007) and reduce GDP by 4.7% in the US alone (CBO 2005).
Because there is little that can be done about a disease's case fatality rate, but a lot that con be done to
limit the spread of disease, the WHO's strategy for coping with outbreaks relies heavily on early detection
and containment. But detection requires disclosure (Science Jan. 20, 2006). So minimizing the loss of life
demands an understanding of countries' incentives to disclose evidence of disease outbreaks.
This paper models this disclosure as a signaling game. The main innovations are to allow the coun-
try's private information  it's domestic surveillance  to be an imperfect indicator of an outbreak and to
permit an exogenous public signal  informal or rumor surveillance  of whether there is an outbreak. The
rst innovation reveals that improvements in formal surveillance technology may, counterintuitively, dis-
courage disclosure of outbreaks. While better technology may increase the expected benets from medical
assistance, it also increases the economic sanctions because a more informative disclosure will give trading
partners more reason to fear an epidemic. The second innovation reveals that informal surveillance is less
harmful to disclosure than formal surveillance. The reason is that a negative public signal increases trade
following a false positive disclosure and a positive public signal reduces trade after a false negative disclo-
sure. Therefore, informal surveillance reduces the relative sanction from truthfully disclosing that evidence
of an outbreak from formal surveillance.
Of course, incentives to disclosure are only half the story. To have information to disclose, a country
must rst invest in surveillance. If a country does not plan to disclose any information, it has less reason
14Between 2003 and August 11, 2009, it had infected 438 and killed 262 in 15 countries (WHO 2009c).
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to invest in surveillance. If the level of investment in surveillance affects the quality of information gath-
ered, however, the relationship becomes more complicated. If better detection discourages disclosure, then
reducing investment in surveillance may encourage disclosure.
Even before investing in surveillance, there is much a country can do to reduce the probability of an
outbreak. It could also invest in preventative measures such as sanitation or vaccination. To the extent that
ex post medical assistance designed to promote disclosure functions as insurance against an outbreak, it may
substitute for self-self help through preventative measures (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). Thus, there may be
a trade-off between ex post reporting and ex ante infection control.
Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. The most notable is that we have only considered a
one-shot game that does not account for the role of repeat play and reputation. If countries can develop a
bad reputation for not truthfully disclosing an epidemic, and this lower levels of trade between epidemics,
then countries have an additional incentive to disclose. This may be an explanation for China's relatively
greater cooperation with international swine u surveillance after it's widely denounced decision initially to
suppress news of SARS (Science July 18, 2003).
The paper offers some clear directions for policy. First, providing countries with the ability to control
outbreaks is likely to encourage countries to look for and report outbreaks by increasing the benets of
disclosure. Second, efforts to upgrade surveillance capacity in countries should pay attention to their effect
on incentives for reporting outbreaks. Third, reducing the burden or pain of sanctions after disclosure of an
outbreak could helpful in encouraging reporting. While it may be difcult to coordinate trading partners so
as to prevent sanctions upon disclosure, it may be possible  through the IMF or World Bank  to provide
countries with nancial insurance against economic consequences of sanctions.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8. Observe that limi!0 yi = y and limii!0 y = y. So increasing 
i from 0 is akin
to introducing informal surveillance. Furthermore,
dyi
di
=
~B0
 
N;i

N   ~B0  P;i (1  w) (1  w)P
pP;iw
  y
iP
pP;i
dyi
di
=
~B0
 
i
  ~B0  P;i (1  w) (1  w)P
pP;iw
  y
iP
pP;i
Improving iP increases these cutoffs at the positive public signal node if
  ~B0  P;iP (1  w)P (1  w) > PwyP   ~B0  N;iP N
  ~B0  P;iP (1  w)P (1  w) > PwyP   ~B0  iP 
27
respectively. Reducing iN increases these cutoffs at the negative public signal node if
  ~B0  N;iNN + PwyP >   ~B0  P;iN (1  w)P (1  w)
  ~B0  iN+ PwyP >   ~B0  P;iN (1  w)P (1  w)
respectively. Obviously, increasing the predictive value of a positive public signal has no effect on games
played at the negative public signal node and vice versa.
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider the marginal effects of improving the predictive value of a positive signal
at the positive node. The effects on the separating equilibrium threshold are:
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
=
~B0
 
N;iP

wyiP
N
P
 
~B0
 
P;iP (1  w) (1  w)
wyiP
  1
dyiP
dP
P
yiP
=
  ~B0  P;iP (1  w) (1  w)
wyiP
  1 =
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
 
~B0
 
N;iP

wyiP
N
P
>
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
The effects on the pooling equilibrium threshold are
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
=
~B0
 
iP

PwyiP
 
~B0
 
P;iP (1  w) (1  w)
wyiP
  1
dyiP
dP
P
yiP
=
  ~B0  P;iP (1  w) (1  w)iP
wyiP
  1
=
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
 
~B0
 
iP

PwyiP
>
dyiP
diP
iP
yiP
A one percent improvement in the private signal increases these thresholds more than a one percent im-
provement in the public signal.
Consider the marginal effects of improving the predictive value of a positive signal at the negative node.
The effects on the separating equilibrium threshold are dyiN=diP = 0 and
dyiN
dP
=
  ~B0  P;iN (1  w) (1  w)iN
pP;iNw
  y
iNiN
pP;iN
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The effects on the pooling equilibrium threshold are dyiN=diP = 0 and
dyiN
dP
=
  ~B0  P;iN (1  w) (1  w)iN
pP;iNw
  y
iNiN
pP;iN
If a better private signal raises the separating or pooling equilibrium threshold, it is more harmful than a
better public signal.
Consider marginal effects of improving the predictive value of a negative signal at the positive node. A
better private signal raises the separating equilibrium threshold more than a better public signal:
  dy
iP
diN
= 0 <  
~B0
 
N;iP

iP
pP;iPw
=  dy
iP
dN
Further, there is no difference in the effect of an improvement in the public signal and the private signal on
the pooling equilibrium threshold.
Consider the marginal effect of improving the predictive value of a negative signal at the negative node.
The effects on the separating equilibrium threshold are
 dy
iN
diN
iN
yiN
=  
~B0
 
N;iN

wyiN
N
P
+
~B0
 
P;iN (1  w) (1  w)
wyiN
+ 1
 dy
iN
dN
N
yiN
=  
~B0
 
N;iN

wyiN
N
P
=
dyiN
diN
iN
yiN
+
dyiN
dP
P
yiN
A one percent improvement in private signal raises the separating equilibrium threshold more than a one
percent improvement in the public signal if a more predictive positive private signal would also increase that
threshold. The effects on the pooling equilibrium threshold are:
 dy
iN
diN
=  
~B0
 
iN
  ~B0  P;iN (1  w) (1  w)P
pP;iNw
+
yiNP
pP;iN
and  dyiN=dN = 0. If a better public signal raises the pooling equilibrium threshold, then it is more
harmful than a better private signal.
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